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THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION
IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
WILLIAM S. DODGE*
INTRODUCTION
Morton Horwitz dates the full emergence of the public-private
distinction in law to the nineteenth century. “One of the central goals
of nineteenth century legal thought was to create a clear separation
between constitutional, criminal, and regulatory law—public law—
and the law of private transactions—torts, contracts, property, and
1
commercial law.” The purpose of the distinction was “to stake out
distinctively private spheres free from the encroaching power of the
2
state” and to create “a neutral and apolitical system of legal doctrine
and legal reasoning free from what was thought to be the dangerous
3
and unstable redistributive tendencies of democratic politics.” In the
early twentieth century, the public-private distinction came under attack, particularly from legal realists who argued that because privatelaw rights were enforced by the state they should be conceptualized
as delegations of public power to private individuals.4 “By 1940, it was
a sign of legal sophistication to understand the arbitrariness of the di5
vision of law into public and private realms.”

* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. My thanks to Hannah
Buxbaum and Mary Kay Kane for comments on an earlier draft.
1. Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1423, 1424 (1982).
2. Id. at 1423; see also Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Reputation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1982) (“The distinction
between public and private connects with a central tenet of liberal thought: the insistence that
because individuals have rights, there are limits on the power of government vis-à-vis the individual.”).
3. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1425.
4. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 585-92 (1933);
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12-14 (1927).
5. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1426; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of
the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982) (tracing the public/private distinction from its heyday to its demise).
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The purpose of this paper is to explore whether a public-private
distinction exists in the conflict of laws, as well as the nature of that
distinction and whether it ought to be maintained. At first glance, a
public-private distinction would certainly seem to exist in the conflict
of laws. For example, a court’s approach to determining the applicable law in a suit touching multiple jurisdictions differs dramatically
depending on whether the claim is one of tort or antitrust. In a torts
case, the court looks to the particular forum’s choice-of-law rules to
determine which jurisdiction’s substantive law should apply. If the
answer is foreign law, the court applies that law and decides the case
6
on the merits. In an antitrust case, by contrast, the court does not
look to the forum’s choice-of-law rules to decide which antitrust law
should govern. Instead, it construes its own antitrust law to decide
whether that law reaches the case, and if it does not, the court simply
dismisses the claim. Under no circumstances does the court decide
the case by applying foreign antitrust law.7
One may identify at least two basic differences in the approaches
taken by courts. First, in the private law context, the court answers
the question of applicable law by resorting to rules that are external to
the substantive law, specifically by applying the forum’s choice-of-law
rules. In the context of public law, the court’s method is internal—it
looks for the answer to the applicability question in the substantive
law itself. Second, in the private law context, a court will apply foreign law to decide a case if it determines that foreign law governs. In
the public law context, the court will not apply foreign law but will
dismiss the case if it finds the forum’s law inapplicable. In other
words, in private law cases the court asks which substantive law applies, while in public law cases it asks whether the forum’s substantive
law applies.
A number of scholars have noted the similarity of the applicablelaw question in the public-law and private-law realms and have urged
that conflicts principles be used to define the extraterritorial reach of
regulatory legislation.8 For the most part, however, these scholars ac-

6. See, e.g., Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999).
7. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168-69 (2004).
8. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975, 997-98 (1994); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1 (1992); Lea
Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (1987); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in
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cept the external-internal and which-whether distinctions described
above. In his seminal article on the subject, Donald Trautman conceded that a court construing a regulatory statute must ultimately
ground its decision upon legislative intent: “Strictly the job of the
9
judge is to apply the statute within the limits laid down by Congress.”
Trautman further noted that “[a] court faced with the question
whether to apply its regulatory statute does not have the alternative
of applying some other statute as a substitute except where the foreign statute provides private remedies enforceable by the forum; the
choice is simply whether or not to apply the statute of the forum.”10
Trautman and others have argued that conflicts thinking should influence the interpretation of regulatory statutes, but not that the rules of
conflicts should be applied directly to them.
In Part I of this paper, I point out that courts have long been doing precisely what Trautman and others have urged. Although
choice-of-law rules have not been applied directly to regulatory statutes, they have long influenced the approaches courts have taken in
interpreting the extraterritorial reach of such statutes. As choice-oflaw rules have changed, so too have the ways in which courts construe
the scope of regulatory statutes. Parts II and III examine the external-internal and which-whether distinctions in more detail. Part II
shows that the core of the external-internal distinction is the courts’
perceived need to ground decisions about the applicability of public
law in legislative intent. The problem is that there is often no real
evidence of legislative intent with respect to when a statute, the purpose of which would be served by applying it, should not be applied
to serve other ends. It would be better for courts to assume responsibility for formulating rules to handle such cases, as they do with private law. Part III examines the reasons for the which-whether distinction, arguing that the reasons for refusing to apply foreign public law

the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their
Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311 (1979-II); Donald T. Trautman, The Role of Conflicts
Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST.
L. J. 586 (1961). Others have been more skeptical. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a “Choice-ofLaw” Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (1992); Friedrich K. Juenger, Constitutional Control of
Extraterritoriality?: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer’s Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 39 (1987); Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280 (1982).
9. Trautman, supra note 8, at 587.
10. Id. at 617.
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are generally unconvincing. Only the need to ensure reciprocity justifies such a distinction, but the distinction it supports is one between
public and private plaintiffs, not public and private laws. The last section concludes.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF CONFLICTS ON
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Changing theories about the conflict of laws have long had an indirect influence on the interpretation of regulatory statutes.11 Take
the example of antitrust. Over the past century, U.S. courts have
adopted three distinct approaches to the extraterritorial scope of the
Sherman Act: (1) a territorial approach; (2) an effects approach; and
(3) a balancing approach. Each has been heavily influenced by developments in the conflict of laws.
The Supreme Court first construed the scope of the Sherman Act
12
in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. Justice Holmes held
that the Act did not extend to the anticompetitive activities of a U.S.
company in Central America.
[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of
the country where the act is done. Slater v. Mexican National R.R.
Co., 194 U. S. 120, 126. . . . This principle was carried to an extreme
in Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Massachusetts, 374. For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he
did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference
with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
13
nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.

As Larry Kramer has observed, Holmes’s analysis was “pure conflict
of laws.”14 Each of the authorities on which he relied was either a conflicts case or a conflicts treatise. The first was his own opinion in Slater, a torts case and the leading judicial statement of the “vested
rights” theory of conflicts that then prevailed. The vested rights theory was based on a territorial view of sovereign power. Although

11. For further discussion, see William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws
Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 110-43 (1998).
12. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
13. Id. at 356 (citing Phillips v. Eyre, (1869) 4 L.R.Q.B. 225, 239 (U.K.), aff’d, (1870) 6
L.R.Q.B. 1, 28 (U.K.)); DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 647 (2d ed. 1908).
14. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991
SUP. CT. REV. 179, 186.
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foreign law was not “operative outside its own territory,” it could create an obligation within its own territory that other courts would en15
force. Under this theory, “the only source of this obligation is the
law of the place of the act.”16 But while Holmes looked to the conflict
of laws for guidance in American Banana, he did not apply its rules
directly to the Sherman Act. Instead he adopted a presumption
about legislative intent based upon those rules. “The foregoing considerations would lead, in case of doubt, to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate
17
power.”
The vested rights theory soon crumbled under attacks from legal
realists during the 1920s and 30s and was ultimately supplanted by a
series of approaches authorizing the forum to apply its own law. In
18
Guiness v. Miller, Judge Learned Hand articulated what came to be
19
known as the “local law” theory. Its basic premise was that “no court
can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign,” although Hand
noted that a court would “impose[] an obligation of its own as nearly
homologous as possible to that arising in the place where the tort occurs.”20 Though criticized by some as mere wordplay,21 the local law
theory importantly emphasized the autonomy of the forum in deciding what law to apply. In the 1930s, a series of conflicts opinions by
Justice Stone relaxed the territoriality of the vested rights theory as a
matter of constitutional law and began to emphasize governmental
interests as a basis for choosing the applicable law.22 In Pacific Employers, Stone held that the forum could apply its own law even

15. Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
16. Id.
17. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357.
18. 291 F. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
19. See generally David F. Cavers, The Two “Local Law” Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV. 822
(1950).
20. Guiness, 291 F. at 770.
21. See, e.g., Gerhard Kegel, Private International Law: Fundamental Approaches, in III
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3, 10-11 (Kurt Lipstein ed., 1986)
(“If this notion were to be transposed from the realm of law to that of languages, the conclusion
would have to be: If an Englishman speaks French, he speaks English in reality, fashioned as
nearly as possible in conformity with French.”).
22. See Alaska Packers Assoc. v. Indus. Accidents Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
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though another state might apply its law “with respect to the same
23
persons and events.”
The impact of these developments on the interpretation of the
Sherman Act can be seen in Hand’s 1945 decision in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), which broke with American Banana and applied the Act extraterritorially on the basis of effects:
[W]e are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the United States of persons not in allegiance to it. That being so, the only question open is whether
Congress intended to impose the liability, and whether our own
Constitution permitted it to do so: as a court of the United States,
we cannot look beyond our own law. Nevertheless, it is quite true
that we are not to read general words, such as those in this Act,
without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations
upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the ‘Conflict of Laws.’ We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch,
24
for conduct which has no consequences within the United States.

Turning to those limitations, Hand observed, “it is settled law . . . that
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends.”25 Thus, Hand construed the
Sherman Act to reach anticompetitive agreements between foreign
companies outside the United States “if they were intended to affect
imports and did affect them.”26
Hand’s line in Alcoa that “as a court of the United States, we
cannot look beyond our own law” obviously echoes his statement in
Guiness that “no court can enforce any law but that of its own sover27
eign.” At the same time, the conflicts rule to which Hand looked to
authorize the application of the forum’s law on the basis of effects reflects the influence of Justice Stone’s opinions loosening the restraints
of territoriality. It is also worth noting that Hand, like Holmes, did

23. Pac. Employers, 306 U.S. at 502. Brainerd Currie would later develop Stone’s approach into what became known as “governmental interest analysis.” Currie wrote: “If the
court finds that the forum state has an interest in the application of its policy, it should apply the
law of the forum, even though the foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy . . . .” BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 184
(1963).
24. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 444.
27. Guiness v. Miller, 291 F. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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not apply conflicts rules directly to the Sherman Act but rather read
congressional intent against the background of those rules: “We
should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts
can catch . . . .”28
In time, some courts adopted a third approach to the Sherman
Act that balanced U.S. interests against those of other nations. In
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,29 the court proposed to
weigh a variety of factors to determine “whether the interests of, and
links to, the United States—including the magnitude of the effect on
American foreign commerce—are sufficiently strong, vis-à-vis those
of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.”30
In developing this approach, Timberlane drew expressly on conflicts:
“We believe that the field of conflict of laws presents the proper approach, as was suggested, if not specifically employed, in Alcoa.”31 Of
course, Alcoa had employed a conflicts approach, but the rules of
conflicts had evolved in the interim. Most significantly, the 1971 Restatement (Second) of Conflicts had adopted a “most significant relationship” test32 that asked courts to consider the contacts of each jurisdiction to the case and a series of factors set forth in Section 6.
Timberlane’s balancing approach was quite similar, and indeed the
court cited Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) in support.33
Once again, the court did not apply choice-of-law rules directly
to the statute, but seemed to think them relevant to an analysis of
what Congress intended, as Timberlane’s reliance on Alcoa would indicate.34 Other advocates of this balancing approach have more explicitly justified it in terms of congressional intent. Writing in dissent
35
in Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, Justice Scalia noted that decisions like Timberlane had “tempered the extraterritorial application

28. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added); see also id. (“the only question open is
whether Congress intended to impose the liability”).
29. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
30. Id. at 613.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 145 (1971).
33. See Timberlane, 549 F.3d at 614 n.29 (1976).
34. See id. at 613 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416,
443 (2d Cir. 1945)) (“[W]e are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the ‘Conflict of Laws.’”).
35. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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of the Sherman Act with considerations of ‘international comity.’”36
He emphasized that this comity was “exercised by legislatures when
37
they enact laws” and that courts construing statutes in the light of
comity were simply following the presumed intent of those legislatures.
In sum, courts have again and again looked to conflicts rules for
guidance in construing the Sherman Act. Courts have not applied
these conflicts rules directly, as they would to private law, but have
instead viewed the rules as relevant to the question of legislative intent. As the conflicts rules have changed from vested rights, to the
law of the forum, to interest balancing, so too has the courts’ construction of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach.
II. THE EXTERNAL-INTERNAL DISTINCTION
Although developments in the conflict of laws have clearly influenced the ways in which courts construe the reach of public-law statutes like the Sherman Act, there still appear to be large methodological differences between multijurisdictional tort cases and
multijurisdictional antitrust cases. One such difference is what we
might call the external-internal distinction. In a torts case, the court
looks to conflicts rules external to the substantive law to tell what law
governs. In an antitrust case, the court does not apply external
choice-of-law rules. Rather, it looks for legislative intent.
Choice-of-law rules are, by definition, external to the substantive
law. Section 4 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts expressly distinguishes between a state’s “rules of Conflict of Laws” and its “local
law.”38 Choice-of-law rules “do not themselves determine the rights
and liabilities of the parties, but rather guide decisions as to which lo39
cal law rule will be applied to determine these rights and duties.” In

36. Id. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 4(1) (1971). Conflict of laws rules include
not only the choice-of-law rules that are the focus of this paper, but also rules on judicial jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments. See id. § 2, cmt. a.
39. Id. § 2, cmt. a. In the United States, choice-of-law rules are typically rules of judgemade common law. About half the states follow the approach of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts, but a number continue to follow the traditional approach of the first Restatement,
while others have adopted distinct approaches. For a listing of methodologies, see Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2006: Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 697, 713 (2006).
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Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp.,40 to take a recent example, Judge
Posner looked to Illinois’s choice-of-law rules to decide whether Illinois’s rule of comparative negligence or Mexico’s rule of contributory
negligence should apply to a tort claim by an Illinois resident arising
from an injury in Mexico. Illinois had adopted the approach of the
Restatement (Second), so because Mexico had the most significant relationship to the issue, Posner applied Mexico’s substantive law and
granted summary judgment for the defendant.
When the plaintiff’s claim is based on public law, a court’s approach is different. As we saw in Part I, courts do not apply choiceof-law rules directly to decide whether a regulatory statute like the
Sherman Act reaches a particular case, even though their approaches
have been strongly influenced by those rules. Instead, courts have
sought their answers within the substantive law itself, grounding their
decisions about extraterritorial scope in the intent of the legislature.
Sometimes Congress speaks directly to the extraterritorial scope
of its regulatory laws. After the Supreme Court construed Title VII
to not apply extraterritorially,41 Congress amended it to provide that,
“[w]ith respect to employment in a foreign country, [‘employee’] includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.”42 It further
specified that Title VII would not apply to foreign companies abroad
43
unless they were controlled by American employers and would not
apply in cases where the discrimination abroad was compelled by for44
eign law. To take another example, Congress provided in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) that the
Sherman Act does not apply to anticompetitive conduct that affects
only foreign markets.45
Frequently, though, Congress does not specify the extraterritorial reach of its regulatory laws. In these cases, courts employ a series

40. Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999).
41. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
43. Id. § 2000e-1(c).
44. Id. § 2000e-1(b). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) contains similar provisions specifying its extraterritorial scope. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f)(1), 623(h), 630(f).
45. More specifically, the Sherman Act does not apply to conduct involving commerce with
foreign nations other than import commerce unless such conduct has “a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. commerce and such conduct gives rise to “a claim” under
the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
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of presumptions about legislative intent.46 One of these is the presumption against extraterritoriality: “that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”47 Applying this presumption
in Aramco, the Supreme Court held that Title VII (prior to its
amendment in 1991) did not apply to employment discrimination by
an American employer against an American citizen in Saudi Arabia.
The Court framed the question as one of legislative intent: “It is our
task to determine whether Congress intended the protections of Title
VII to apply to United States citizens employed by American em48
ployers outside of the United States.” The Court then turned to the
presumption against extraterritoriality as “‘a valid approach whereby
unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained.’”49 The presumption assumes that Congress wants to avoid “unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord,”50 and that Congress “‘is primarily concerned
51
with domestic conditions.’”
A second presumption to which courts sometimes turn is the socalled Charming Betsy presumption that “an act of congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possi52
ble construction remains.” Like the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Charming Betsy presumption is frequently justified as a
reflection of congressional intent. “It is generally assumed that Congress does not intend to repudiate an international obligation of the
United States,” explains the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law.53 Dissenting in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,54 Jus-

46. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality and the Charming Betsy presumption).
47. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). For further discussion of the presumption
against extraterritoriality, see William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85 (1998).
48. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
49. Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
52. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115, cmt. a (1987). For discussion of alternative justifications, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretative Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479
(1998).
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tice Scalia employed the presumption in just this way. Section 403 of
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law says that customary
international law prohibits the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction
when it would be unreasonable based on an evaluation of factors like
55
those set forth in Timberlane. After weighing those factors, Justice
Scalia concluded that application of the Sherman Act would be unreasonable and that “therefore it is inappropriate to assume, in the
absence of statutory indication to the contrary, that Congress has
made such an assertion.”56 Justice Scalia termed the resulting deference to the interests of other nations “prescriptive comity,”57 and he
took care to describe it as a matter of legislative intent rather than judicial fiat. Prescriptive comity, he wrote, “is not the comity of courts,
whereby judges decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more ap58
propriately adjudged elsewhere.” Instead it “is exercised by legislatures when they enact laws, and courts assume it has been exercised
when they come to interpreting the scope of laws their legislatures
have enacted.”59
“Prescriptive comity” moved from dissent to majority in the F.
60
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. case. At issue was
whether anticompetitive conduct that both occurred abroad and affected the plaintiffs there was exempted from the reach of the
Sherman Act by the FTAIA. Although Justice Breyer looked to the
language of the FTAIA61 and to its legislative history,62 he relied heavily upon a “rule of construction” interpreting ambiguous statutes so as
54. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403. Whether § 403 in fact
reflects customary international law is a matter of some controversy. See David B. Massey,
How the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The Reasonableness Requirement
of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 419 (1997).
56. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a critique of Justice Scalia’s analysis, see Dodge, supra note 11, at 138-43. The majority read § 403 as limited to situations where a
party subject to regulation by two states cannot comply with the laws of both. Hartford, 509 U.S.
at 798-99. Although the FTAIA addresses the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act
in some circumstances, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, the majority thought it was
unclear whether the FTAIA would apply and concluded that the anticompetitive conduct alleged in Hartford would satisfy its standard in any event. Id. at 796 n.23. Justice Scalia apparently did not think the FTAIA applicable, for he did not mention it.
57. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004).
61. Id. at 161-62, 173-74.
62. Id. at 169-73.
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“to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of
63
other nations.” As with the other presumptions we have seen,
Breyer’s presumption against unreasonable interference was premised upon congressional intent. “This rule of statutory construction
cautions courts to assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American
laws.”64
Is the external-internal distinction I have sketched more apparent than real? After all, external choice-of-law rules often direct
courts to look internally at the purpose of a law in a way that resembles a search for legislative intent. At the same time, the presumptions about legislative intent to which courts often resort when construing regulatory statutes might be characterized as external choiceof-law rules in disguise. We shall examine each of these challenges in
turn.
Modern choice-of-law rules tend to give great weight to governmental interests. The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts says that “the
state whose interests are most deeply affected should have its local
law applied.”65 In evaluating those interests, courts typically examine
the purpose of each jurisdiction’s substantive law to see if that purpose would be served by applying it to the case at hand. In Babcock
v. Jackson, for example, the New York Court of Appeals observed
that,
[t]he object of Ontario’s guest statute . . . is ‘to prevent the
fraudulent assertion of claims by passengers, in collusion with

63. Id. at 164. Whether such a rule of construction exists is an important question. The
authorities Breyer cited do not state such a rule but rely instead on the quite different rule that
“an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(emphasis added). Justice Breyer’s citation of Restatement (Third) § 403 suggests that he was
relying upon it for the proposition that customary international law forbids unreasonable exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction, but as noted above the accuracy of § 403 as a statement of customary international law is contested. See supra note 55. In any event, Justice Breyer did not
endorse the case-by-case weighing of factors envisioned in § 403, commenting that “this approach is too complex to prove workable.” Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168.
64. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 6, cmt. f (1971); see, e.g., Reich v. Purcell,
432 P.2d 727, 729 (Cal. 1967) (“The forum must search to find the proper law to apply based
upon the interests of the litigants and the involved states.”); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d
279, 283 (N.Y. 1963) (“Justice . . . may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of
the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties
has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.”).
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the drivers, against insurance companies’ . . . and quite obviously, the fraudulent claims intended to be prevented by the
statute are those asserted against Ontario defendants and their
insurance carriers.66
Because Babcock involved a New York defendant, Ontario’s purpose
would not be served by applying its law. “Whether New York defendants are imposed upon or their insurers defrauded by a New York
plaintiff is scarcely a valid legislative concern of Ontario simply because the accident occurred there.”67
The distinction between interest analysis and legislative intent
becomes apparent, however, in the case of “true conflicts”: when the
purpose of each state’s law would be served by applying it. In Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,68 the California Supreme
Court faced a conflict between two state statutes. California’s statute
would have permitted the plaintiff corporation to recover for the loss
of an injured employee’s services, while Louisiana’s statute would
have protected the defendant corporation against liability. The purpose of each statute would have been served by applying it to the
case,69 so the court had to choose. It chose Louisiana’s statute, not on
the basis of legislative intent but by applying an external choice-oflaw rule, specifically the court’s “comparative impairment” approach.70 The court candidly admitted that “the resolution of true
conflict cases may be described as ‘essentially a process of allocating
71
respective spheres of lawmaking influence.’” The important point is
that those spheres were allocated not by a legislature but by the court,
through its adoption of a particular choice-of-law rule. The Court
never asked if the California legislature would have intended its statute to give way in the face of a stronger foreign interest.
One may also challenge the external-internal distinction by asking whether the presumptions about legislative intent that courts fre-

66. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 284 (quoting Survey of Canadian Legislation, 1 U. TORONTO
L.J. 358, 366 (1936)).
67. Id.; see also Reich, 432 P.2d at 730-31 (examining purpose of Missouri’s wrongful death
statute).
68. 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978).
69. Id. at 725.
70. “[T]he ‘comparative impairment’ approach . . . seeks to determine which state’s interest
would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state.” Id. at
726.
71. Id. (quoting William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 11-12 (1963)).
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quently apply to regulatory statutes are not in fact external choice-oflaw rules. It should be obvious that these presumptions are at least
not the same external choice-of-law rules that courts apply to private
law. Although Empagran’s presumption against unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations bears some resemblance to the most-significant-relationship test of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts, it also differs from that test by, for example, re72
jecting the notion of a case-by-case balancing test. Aramco’s presumption against extraterritoriality harkens back to the choice-of-law
rules of an earlier era, which only a few courts continue to apply to73
day. The Charming Betsy presumption has no analogue in choiceof-law jurisprudence since it is designed to mediate not between the
local laws of various jurisdictions but between local law and international law. It shapes the extraterritorial application of regulatory
statutes only when joined with international law rules on prescriptive
jurisdiction to create what Justice Scalia described as “prescriptive
comity.”74
The real reason the presumptions applied to regulatory statutes
cannot properly be characterized as external choice of law rules,
however, is that they are all ultimately justified on the basis of legislative intent in a way that choice-of-law rules are not. “Prescriptive
comity,” Justice Scalia wrote in Hartford, is not exercised by courts
75
The presumption
but “by legislatures when they enact laws.”
against unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of
other nations “cautions courts to assume that legislators take account
of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write
American laws.”76 The presumption against extraterritoriality is defended as “‘a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional in77
tent may be ascertained.’” Even if the congressional intent these
presumptions embody is imaginary, the court purports to be carrying
out the will of the legislature when the issue is one of public law. In

72. See supra note 63.
73. See Kramer, supra note 14, at 184 (characterizing the presumption as an “anachronism”).
74. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
77. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
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the context of private law, by contrast, legislative intent is relevant
only insofar as the court’s own choice-of-law rules have made it so.
One might hypothesize that this distinction reflects the presence
of a statute in one case and not in the other. When a court must determine whether a statute applies, it seems natural to look for legislative intent. When a court is deciding the applicability of a commonlaw rule, it seems more justifiable to look to choice-of-law rules that
are similarly judge-made. The problem is that the presence or absence of a statute does not in fact correspond with a court’s willingness to apply external choice-of-law rules. A number of leading conflicts cases have applied the forum’s external choice-of-law rules to
private law statutes just as though the rules were ones of common
law. Take Babcock v. Jackson, in which the New York Court of Appeals adopted a “center of gravity” approach for tort conflicts and
then applied that approach to decide that Ontario’s guest statute did
not bar a suit between two New York residents arising out of an
78
automobile accident in Ontario. Or take Offshore Rental Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., in which the California Supreme Court applied
its “comparative impairment” approach to choose a Louisiana statute
barring a corporation from recovering for the loss of an injured employee’s services as the governing law over a contrary statute of its
own state.79 Or consider Schmidt v. Briscoll Hotel, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court framed the issue of whether Minnesota’s dram
shop act applied to an accident in Wisconsin solely in terms of
whether it should depart from the rules of the first Restatement of
Conflicts.80
Instead, whether the court applies external choice-of-law rules or
searches internally for intent seems to turn on whether the court perceives the statute to create rules of private or of public law. But this
distinction is vulnerable for two reasons. First, it ignores the legal realists’ attack on the public-private distinction more generally, that because private-law rights are enforced by the state they should be con-

78. 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963).
79. 583 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal. 1978).
80. 82 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Minn. 1957). There are counter examples, of course. In Graham
v. Gen. U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, V.F.W., 248 N.E.2d 657 (Ill. 1969), the Supreme Court of Illinois refused to apply its “center of gravity” rule to Illinois’s dram shop act, id. at 659, observing
that “the question of whether the Dram Shop Act should be given extraterritorial effect is a
question of policy that is particularly within the province of the legislature.” Id. at 660. Graham, however, seems to be unusual in treating a private-law statute this way.
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ceptualized as delegations of public power to private individuals.81 It
is widely recognized today that rules of contracts, torts, property, and
the like do reflect considerations of public policy. Second, the distinction overlooks the private-law roots of many public-law statutes.
“The congressmen who drafted and passed the Sherman Antitrust
Law thought they were merely declaring illegal offenses that the
common law had always prohibited.”82 The Supreme Court has noted
83
that the Sherman Act “invokes the common law,” and has treated it
as “a common-law statute” authorizing judicial development in the
tradition of the common law.84 So too with statutory provisions on securities fraud, which the Court recently noted have “common-law
85
roots.” In the end, it is not at all clear that antitrust law is fundamentally different from unfair competition in torts, or securities fraud
from common-law fraud.
Even if there is no particular reason to distinguish between public and private law and to give primacy to legislative intent with respect to the former, one might wonder if there is any particular harm
in doing so, particularly when so much of the actual work is done by
judicially created presumptions. It seems useful here to divide the intent inquiry into two separate questions: (1) would applying a regulatory statute advance its purposes; and (2) should its application nevertheless be limited to serve other ends? The first question is usually
86
easy to answer for both public and private law. The second is far
more difficult. When the legislature speaks directly to the applicabil87
ity question, of course the court must obey. And sometimes legisla-

81. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
82. William Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L.
REV. 355, 355 (1954); see also Donald Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759, 759 (1955); 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (“It does
not announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized principles of the common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal Government.”). That the Act
went beyond the existing common law, see Letwin, supra, at 385; Dewey, supra, at 786, does not
undercut the point that the subject matter was one traditionally treated by the common law.
83. Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988).
84. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007).
85. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005); see also LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 846-55 (4th ed. 2001) (describing
relationship between SEC fraud concepts and common law deceit).
86. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 6(1) (2007) (“A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.”).
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tures do provide explicit instruction, in both the areas of public law88
89
and private law. But usually there is only silence on the second
90
question. Indeed, sometimes the silence seems deliberate. As the
courts’ approach to the Sherman Act swung during the twentieth century from territoriality to effects to balancing, Congress declined to
amend the statute to clarify its extraterritorial reach. When Congress
passed the FTAIA in 1982, the House Report stated that the Act was
“intended neither to prevent nor to encourage additional judicial recognition of the special international characteristics of transactions. If
a court determines that the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are met, this bill would have no effect on the courts’ ability to
employ notions of comity, see, e.g., Timberlane.”91 Under these circumstances, to say that any particular approach to the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act reflects congressional intent is simply
fanciful. It allows the courts to avoid responsibility for making the
difficult policy choices involved, a responsibility they have willingly
and ably assumed in the context of private law.
III. THE WHICH-WHETHER DISTINCTION
Another distinction between private and public law cases concerns the court’s willingness to apply foreign law. In multijurisdictional tort suits, if the forum’s choice-of-law rules point to foreign
law, courts will routinely apply that law and decide the case on the
merits.92 In multijurisdictional antitrust suits, courts dismiss the case if
they find that the forum’s law does not apply. They never apply foreign antitrust law. In Empagran, for example, foreign vitamin purchasers in Australia, Ecuador, Panama, and Ukraine brought suit
88. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (specifying the extraterritorial scope of Title VII).
89. Section 1-105 of the original UCC provided that the Code should be applied “to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.” Revised Article 1 would have eliminated
the bias in favor of forum law and referred courts to the choice-of-law rules of the forum, but
each of the 29 states to have adopted Revised Article 1 as of this writing has retained the UCC’s
original provision on applicability. See Uniform Law Commission, Final Acts and Legislation
by State, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited March 28, 2008).
90. This should not be surprising if, as the Aramco Court noted, Congress “‘is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions.’” EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
91. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13 (1983), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court noted in Hartford that Congress had declined to take a position on Timberlane. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993).
92. See, e.g., Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying Mexican tort law).
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against defendants alleged to be involved in a price-fixing conspiracy.
As we have seen, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act, as
93
amended by the FTAIA, did not reach the foreign conduct. The
Court did not consider the possibility of applying foreign antitrust law
to decide the claims, despite the fact that Australian law, for example,
allows private damages actions for price fixing.94 Both U.S. and foreign courts have expressed the view that the courts of one nation will
95
not enforce the antitrust laws of another. The same is true of securi96
ties fraud regulation.
97
The roots of this “public law taboo” may be found in two rules
98
that are historically distinct. First, as Chief Justice Marshall wrote in
The Antelope, “[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of

93. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004). Having decided the case on the assumption that the foreign harm caused by the anticompetitive conduct
was independent of the domestic harm, the Supreme Court remanded for consideration of
plaintiffs’ alternative argument that without higher prices in the U.S. the foreign harm would
not have occurred. Id. at 175. On remand, the D.C. Circuit found that the U.S. harm did not
cause the foreign harm and dismissed the case. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche
Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
94. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, pt. VI, § 82 (Austl.) (authorizing damages action for violations of, inter alia, § 45A’s prohibition of price-fixing). At the district court level, the plaintiffs
did seek damages under foreign antitrust law, but the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 2001
WL 761360, at *7-8 (D.D.C. 2001). Other courts have similarly refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign antitrust claims. See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127
F. Supp. 702, 713 n.8 (D. Md. 2001); Info. Res., Inc. v. The Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 127 F.
Supp. 2d 411, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
95. See, e.g., Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 155 F.3d 603,
609 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1067 (1999) (“English courts will not enforce the
Sherman Act.”); Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 891 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983) (“[W]e have little doubt that the Indonesian courts
would quite properly refuse to entertain plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claim.”); British Airways Bd. v.
Laker Airways Ltd., (1985) 1 A.C. 58, 79 (H.L. 1984) (appeal taken from O.B.D.) (U.K.) (“The
Clayton Act which creates the civil remedy with threefold damages for criminal offenses under
the Sherman Act is, under English rules of conflict of laws, purely territorial in its application.”).
One Canadian court has suggested that judgments under the Sherman Act might be enforceable
in Canada, but not that Canadian courts might apply U.S. antitrust law to decide a case in the
first instance. See Old N. State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Servs. Inc., (1998) 58 B.C.L.R.3d 144
(B.C.C.A.).
96. See, e.g., Schemmer v. Prop. Res. Ltd., (1975) 1 Ch. 273, 288 (1974) (U.K.) (“The [Securities Exchange] Act of 1934 is . . . a penal law of the United States of America and, as such, unenforceable in our courts.”).
97. Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at 322-26.
98. See generally William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J.
161, 165-93 (2002).
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another.”99 Second, as Lord Mansfield wrote in Holman v. Johnson,
100
“no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another.” For
our purposes, it is interesting to note that each of these rules was
originally applied to prevent public-law statutes from interfering with
private rights—the same rationale as the public-private distinction
more generally.101 The revenue rule developed to allow the enforcement of private contracts that violated the customs laws of other
countries. Lord Hardwicke explained in an early English case that “if
it should be laid down, that because goods are prohibited to be exported by the laws of any foreign country from whence they are
brought, therefore the parties should have no remedy or action here,
it would cut off all benefit of such trade from this kingdom.”102 The
penal-laws rule was initially applied to prevent foreign confiscation
103
statutes from barring the enforcement of debts. Later, in The Antelope, Chief Justice Marshall invoked the rule to protect rights in
property—specifically slaves—against the interference of foreign declarations against the slave trade.104
In the twentieth century, the function of these rules in guarding
private rights from public encroachment was abandoned. Courts
stopped enforcing contracts that violated foreign customs laws and
105
export restrictions. “[W]e should take notice of the laws of a
friendly country, even if they are revenue laws or penal laws or political laws,” Lord Denning wrote, “at least, to this extent, that if two
people knowingly agree together to break the laws of a friendly country . . . then they cannot ask this court to give its aid to the enforcement of their agreement.”106 With respect to confiscatory statutes, the
United States Supreme Court went even further, ordering their enforcement in U.S. courts under the act of state doctrine even if the

99. 23 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
100. (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B.).
101. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
102. Boucher v. Lawson, (1734) 95 Eng. Rep. 53, 55-56 (K.B.).
103. See Folliott v. Ogden, (1789) 126 Eng. Rep. 75 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1789), aff’d, Ogden v. Folliott, (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 825 (Ch.); Wolff v. Oxholm, (1817) 105 Eng. Rep. 1177 (K.B.).
104. See 23 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 123.
105. See, e.g., Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia (1944) Ltd., (1956) 2 Q.B. 490 (U.K.) (denying enforcement of contract to export jute bags from India to South Africa in violation of Indian export restrictions); Foster v. Driscoll, (1929) 1 K.B. 470, 510 (denying enforcement of a contract
to smuggle whiskey to the United States in violation of prohibition laws).
106. Regazzoni, (1956) 2 Q.B. at 515-16.
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statutes at issue allegedly violated international law.107 Instead, the
rules were applied to bar foreign governments from enforcing judg108
ments for taxes, and to justify a refusal to enforce U.S. antitrust and
109
securities law.
As the application of the revenue rule and the penal-laws prohibition changed during the twentieth century, new rationales were
found to justify them. One was the supposed difficulty of applying
foreign law. Lord Somervell emphasized this in Government of India
v. Taylor: “If one considers the initial stages of the process, which
may . . . be intricate and prolonged, it would be remarkable comity if
State B allowed the time of its courts to be expended in assisting in
this regard the tax gatherers of State A.”110 A second rationale, which
Judge Learned Hand thought applied both to penal liabilities and to
taxes, was to avoid giving offense to other nations.111 In deciding
whether to enforce the private laws or judgments of a foreign country,
a court considers whether doing so would violate its own public policy. “This is not a troublesome or delicate inquiry when the question
arises between private persons,” Hand said, but “[t]o pass upon the
provisions for the public order of another state is, or at any rate
should be, beyond the powers of a court. . . . It may commit the domestic state to a position which would seriously embarrass its
neighbor.”112 A third rationale has been that enforcing foreign public
law “would have the effect of furthering the governmental interests of
a foreign country, something which our courts customarily refuse to
do.”113

107. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
108. See, e.g., British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979) (denying enforcement of Canadian tax judgment); United States v. Harden, (1963) 41 D.L.R.2d 721, 721-22,
725 (Can.) (denying enforcement of U.S. tax judgment); India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 503-15
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (denying enforcement of Indian tax judgment).
109. See, e.g., British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd, (1985) 1 A.C. 58, 79 (H.L. 1984)
(appeal taken from Q.B.) (U.K.) (stating the English courts would not enforce the Sherman
Act); Schemmer v. Prop. Res. Ltd., (1975) 1 Ch. 273, 288 (1974) (U.K.) (refusing to appoint receiver for assets of defendant in U.S. securities fraud suit on the ground that the Securities Exchange Act was “a penal law”).
110. Taylor, [1955] A.C. at 514. Ironically, Taylor did not involve the “initial stages” of determining the tax owed but simply the enforcement of a tax judgment. But Lord Somervell was
unswayed: “The principle remains. The claim is one for a tax.” Id.
111. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 604 (L. Hand, J., concurring).
113. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1165 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 U.S. 398,
448 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)).
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Most of these rationales do not withstand scrutiny.114 Foreign
public law is inherently no more difficult to apply than foreign private
law. As a South African court noted, “[t]here may be difficulty in interpreting foreign revenue laws but such difficulties are met with in
relation to other foreign laws with which the Courts have on occasion
to grapple.”115 Having to declare a foreign public law contrary to the
forum’s public policy might, on occasion, give offense to another nation, but this “would seldom be more offensive than a flat refusal to
permit any action at all.”116 Most foreign public laws are unlikely to
violate public policy. “After all, every State collects taxes, every State
has a criminal law, and nearly every State regulates commerce in one
way or another.”117 “We are not concerned . . . about tyrannical exactions of Tsarist moguls, and it makes no sense to pretend that we
118
are.”
The argument that one nation should refuse to enforce another’s
public law because doing so would further the other’s governmental
interests ignores the substantial benefits that may be had from coop119
120
eration. If U.S. courts refuse to enforce Canadian tax judgments,
121
and Canadian courts refuse to enforce U.S. ones, each country’s
treasury will be reduced—to the harm of both the country and those
of its respective taxpayers who are unable similarly to evade paying
their taxes. The same is true of antitrust law. A cartel member or
monopolist may not be amenable to personal jurisdiction in the country whose laws it has violated.122 If U.S. courts refuse to enforce Canadian antitrust laws, and Canadian courts refuse to enforce U.S. ones,
some cartel members and monopolists will escape liability and, as a
result, enrich themselves at the expense of consumers. Of course,

114. See Dodge, supra note 98, at 208-19.
115. Comm’r of Taxes v. McFarland 1965 (1) SA 470 (Witwatersrand Local Div.) at 473 (S.
Afr.); see also Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 370 (2005) (rejecting argument that
“courts lack the competence to examine the validity of unfamiliar foreign tax schemes”).
116. Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46
HARV. L. REV. 193, 217 (1932).
117. Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at 323.
118. Id. at 421.
119. See Dodge, supra note 98, at 224-26.
120. See, e.g., British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Harden, (1963) 41 D.L.R.2d 721, 721-22, 725 (Can.).
122. Many countries, including the United States, penalize anticompetitive conduct only
when it harms domestic markets. See, e.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15
U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
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each country will benefit from cooperating only if the other reciprocates. If U.S. judges enforce Canadian antitrust laws, they cannot be
sure that Canadian judges will enforce U.S. antitrust laws. Each court
is caught in a “prisoner’s dilemma.”123 The way out of this dilemma is
for each nation to agree to enforce the other’s regulatory laws, but
this is something only the political branches can do. As Russell Weintraub has observed in a related context, “[i]f in fact a significant sacrifice of United States interests results from [judicial] attempts to serve
comity, international accommodation may . . . be retarded rather than
advanced. Our bargaining chips will have been given away before the
124
political branches could use them.”
If the non-enforcement of foreign public law may be justified because of the need to ensure reciprocity, does this argument not
equally extend to foreign private law? Refusing to enforce Mexican
tort law in U.S. courts would create an incentive to negotiate a treaty
with Mexico that would ensure the reciprocal enforcement of Ameri125
can tort law in Mexican courts. Fairness to private litigants, however, counsels against this. In the analogous context of judgments,
Willis Reese has noted that “the creditor is not to blame for the fact
that the state of rendition does not accord conclusive effect to American judgments, and it might well be thought unfair to rob him on this
account of the essential advantages of his judgment.”126 A defendant
to whom Mexican tort law properly applies would similarly not be to
blame for the fact that Mexico might not enforce American tort law.
The defendant cannot negotiate a bargain for reciprocal enforcement
with the United States in the same way that the Mexican government
could, and it therefore seems unfair to punish that defendant by deny-

123. See Dodge, supra note 98, at 220-26.
124. Weintraub, supra note 8, at 1817.
125. Choice-of-law treaties do exist. In the European Union, the 1980 Rome Convention
sets choice-of-law rules for contracts. See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (Consolidated Version), 1998 O.J. (C 27) 34. The EU recently adopted choice-oflaw rules for torts by regulation. See Commission Regulation 864/2007, The Law Applicable to
Non–contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40. It is worth noting that these rules
apply not just to ordinary torts but also to antitrust violations. See id. art. 6, 2007 O.J. (L 199) at
44 (stating rule for unfair competition and acts restricting free competition); see also id. recital
(22), 2007 O.J. (L 199) at 41 (“The non-contractual obligations arising out of restrictions of
competition in Article 6(3) should cover infringements of both national and Community competition law.”).
126. Willis L.M. Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50
COLUM. L. REV. 783, 793 (1950).
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ing it the defenses available under Mexican tort law, like contributory
127
negligence.
If fairness justifies a distinction between public and private law,
however, it is not a distinction between public and private law but
rather between public and private plaintiffs. A private party bringing
an antitrust claim has been harmed no less, and has no more ability to
negotiate for reciprocal enforcement, than a private party bringing a
tort claim. It is only when a foreign government brings suit in its
regulatory capacity that a lack of reciprocity should bar enforcement
of public law. This is the way the penal-laws prohibition was traditionally understood. Whether a foreign law should be considered
“penal” “so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another state,”
the Supreme Court held in Huntington v. Attrill, “depends upon the
question whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the public
justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured
128
by the wrongful act.” The Privy Council took the same position in a
case arising from the same facts. Enforcement of a foreign law attaching penalties would not be barred “except in cases where these
penalties are recoverable at the instance of the State, or of an official
duly authorized to prosecute on its behalf, or of a member of the public in the character of a common informer.”129
Applying these principles to a private antitrust or securities suit
for damages should lead a court to apply foreign law to the merits if it
determines that foreign law applies. The court in a case like Empagran could proceed to apply foreign antitrust law once it determined
that the Sherman Act did not govern, and the plaintiffs would not
have to refile their claims in the Australian, Ecuadorean, Panamanian, or Ukrainian courts.
CONCLUSION
There is no good reason to maintain the public-private distinction in the conflict of laws. The external-internal distinction is premised on the false notion that it is possible to determine, in cases where
a public-law statute is silent, when the legislature intends to restrict its
application to serve other ends. It would be better for courts to as-

127. See Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999).
128. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892).
129. Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A.C. 150, 157-58 (P.C. 1892) (appeal taken from Ont.)
(U.K.).
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sume this responsibility themselves, as they have for private law.
That is not to say that courts should necessarily apply the approach of
130
the Restatement (Second), just that the approach should not differ
depending on whether the claim is one of public or private law.
The which-whether distinction also lacks a convincing justification. As a general matter, courts should treat foreign public law just
as they do foreign private law, applying it to the merits of cases when
they find that it properly governs. To do so does not seem particularly burdensome, nor likely to cause offense to other nations. To the
extent that the need to ensure reciprocity justifies a refusal to apply
foreign public law, it is limited to situations in which a state brings suit
to vindicate governmental interests. It should not bar antitrust victims from enforcing their rights under foreign law any more than it
should bar tort victims from enforcing theirs.
In sum, it is time for courts faced with issues of public law to go
beyond simply drawing inspiration from conflicts-of-law thinking. It
is time for them to treat public law—like private law—as a proper
subject of the conflict of laws.

130. In the context of antitrust law, I have argued for a forum-law approach quite different
from the Restatement (Second)’s “most significant relationship” test. See Dodge, supra note 11,
at 144-68.

